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Afghanistan Situation Report

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28 January 1986

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RIEF	6	•
PECTIVE ODD AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE PANJSHER	8	25 <b>X</b> 1
Masood has developed an effective civilian supponetwork in the Panjsher, which assists him in obtaining money, supplies, and information.	rt	25 <b>X</b> 1
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office o	f	
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comment on the issues raised in the publication should b		25X1
directed to		25X1
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GIME PRESENCE IN HERAT	
Recent reporting from the US Embassy in Kabul indic that government administrative activity in Herat mag greater than many Western observers previously thou	y be
least six ministries and two government banks have offices there.	at 25
Comment: The resistance has long been active in and around Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city, and regime's administrative units there probably function a low level. As recently as last July combined Sov	the on at iet-
Afghan forces launched operations around the city a	

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which to launch at pipeline, and agai failed to achieve		the western
CKDOWN ON INSURGENT	SYMPATHIZERS	
military officers of Several general of were reportedly are plotting and espion for the insurgents	a growing spread arrests of high occurred in the past ficers in the Ministry rested recently in Kabnage. Although widesp within the government to frustrate efforts er.	-ranking ew months. of Defense oul for coup- oread sympathy and the
co conscillance power	<u> </u>	
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PERSPECTIVE	
MASOOD AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE PANJSHER by NESA	25X1 25X1
The civilian population remaining around the Panjsher Valley contributes to insurgent effectiveness by paying taxes, aiding insurgent resupply efforts, building military facilities, and providing intelligence. Civilians also present Masood with problems, however; to maintain their support he must provide protection, financial support, and attempt to convince them not to	,
blame the guerrillas for the brutal Soviet retaliation that often follows insurgent attacks. As one of a new breed of commanders, he also takes special pains to cultivate civilian support by running an effective local administration, emphasizing Islam, and separating guerrilla bases from civilian areas. In our view, all of these measures, and his military prowess, account for	0574
his widespread popular support.	25X1
Civilian Support to Masood's Operations  Financial Support. Although the Jamiat-i-Islami Organization in Peshawar and various private western support organizations provide a significant portion of	
Masood's income, some Panjsher civilians also contribute to Masood's war chest.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	,
	25 <b>X</b> 1
the civilian population in the	25 <b>X</b> 1
Panjsher now numbers about 20,000 compared to 90-100,000 prior to the Soviet invasion.	25X1
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	25 <b>X</b>
Kabul traders also provide financial	
Kabul traders also provide financial support to Masood. Since the people of Kabul depend on the Salang	
Road being open for Soviet supplies, Masood has agreed	25X
not to interdict all traffic travelling to Kabul and to limit his attacks to military convoys,	25/
In roturn Value and a second	25X
In return, Kabul merchants provide Masood with funds and information,	23/
induction,	25X
	2070
Transportation and Logistics. Civilians in the Panjsher	25X
Valley also make an important contribution to the	2370
resistance by transporting arms and supplies from	
Pakistan. Horses are the primary pack animals in the	
insurgent logistics system and a majority of families in	
the Valley provide at least one horse to ferry arms from	
Pakistan,	25X
The Panjsher insurgents need more horses	25X 25X
than are now available and actively encourage civilians	20/
to raise or buy horses.	25X
The same of the sa	2070
Food. Panjsher Valley food production also contributes	
to the insurgent cause. The Andarab Valleywhere	
Soviet and Afghan forces are strongalso is a source of	25X
food to the insurgents of the Panisher Valley,	
Food production in	25 <b>X</b>
the Panjsher Valley in 1984 was almost nonexistant. but	
output of wheat and corn was up sharply in 1985. Food	
supplies from the Andarab Valley will still be needed.	
but the plentiful harvest in the Panjsher Valley should	
provide the insurgents with a good reserve of food	
stocks and a more varied diet.	25 <b>X</b>
Other Benefits. The presence of civilians and insurgent	
families has a positive effect on insurgent morale in	
the Panjsher Valley. Civilians also provide	
intelligence and serve as laborers to build shelters and	
other facilities at newly-established bases in the	25X
Andarab side valleys,	
	25X
Maintaining Civilian Support	
Masood wants to prevent the remaining civilians from	
becoming refugees in Pakistan.	25X
he pays 5,000 Atghanis (US \$40 at	
bazaar exchange rate) per month per family plus 200	25X
Afghanis per child to civilians deprived of a livelihood	
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insurgent effectiveness, but would not prevent Masood from launching operations in the Panjsher Valley and in the surrounding areas.

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